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Abstract—Network-based intrusion detection systems have al-
ways been designed to report on the presence of attacks. Due
to the sheer and ever-increasing number of attacks on the
Internet, Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs)
are overwhelmed with attack reports. For that reason, there is a
need for the detection of compromises rather than compromise
attempts, since those incidents are the ones that have to be taken
care of. In previous works, we have demonstrated and validated
our state-of-the-art compromise detection algorithm that works
on exported flow data, i.e, data exported using NetFlow or IPFIX.
The detection algorithm has been implemented as part of our
open-source intrusion detection system SSHCure.
In this demonstration, we showcase the latest release of
SSHCure, which includes many new features, such as an over-
hauled user interface design based on user surveys, integration
with incident reporting tools, blacklist integration and IPv6
support. Attendees will be able to explore SSHCure in a semi-live
fashion by means of practical examples of situations that CSIRT
members encounter in their daily activities.
Flow-based intrusion detection is an active area of research,
driven by the need for scalable solutions in high-speed net-
works of 10 Gbps and above. Restrained by the fact that
flows, defined as “a set of IP packets passing an observation
point in the network during a certain time interval” [1],
traditionally only feature traffic information at L3 and L4,
flow-based intrusion detection was always believed to only
be useful for detecting very specific attacks, such as large-
scale flooding attacks and scans [2]. However, also another
class of attacks was shown to be well-detectable using flow
data: brute-force attacks, against SSH or RDP daemons, for
example. The fact that these attacks consist of many login
attempts against a daemon using a dictionary,1 makes that
such attacks feature a very characteristic behavior at the
network-level. Several experimental tools have been developed
by academia for detecting such attacks based on flow data.
However, like most other intrusion detection systems, even
those based on individual packets, these tools merely report
on the presence of attacks. Since many types of attacks are
nowadays considered ‘background noise’ on the Internet, these
attack reports overload Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs). As a consequence, a large number of reports
may cause important reports to be overlooked.
SSHCure is our flow-based SSH intrusion detection system
1Dictionaries are lists with the most popular username and password
combinations.
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Fig. 1. Dictionary attack phases, from [4].
that is unique in many ways. Besides the fact that there hardly
exists any well-maintainted flow-based intrusion detection
system, its most distinguishing feature is the detection of
compromises [3]. As such, CSIRTs can concentrate on those
machines that are known to be compromised and at risk,
both for themselves and other machines, and quarantaine or
disconnect them from the network.
The detection algorithms used by SSHCure have been
completely designed around our SSH attack model since the
very first prototypes. This model classifies SSH attacks into
three consecutive phases, as shown in Fig. 1:
1) Scan – Attackers perform a horizontal network scan to
identify active SSH daemons. This phase features a very
small number of packets per flow, mostly TCP SYN
packets.
2) Brute-force – Attackers perform a brute-force attack by
issuing many authentication requests against one or more
targets (i.e., SSH daemons). This is typically done by
means of dictionaries. The traffic in this phase consists
of high-intensity TCP connections that are very similar
in size (both packets and bytes) and duration, commonly
referred to as flat traffic.
3) Compromise – Attackers have gained access to a target
host by using correct login credentials. This phase
typically features either very small flows in case of idle
connections, or large flows in case the compromised
target is being actively misused.
This attack model was already proposed by our group
as early as 2009 [5] and is still at the core of SSHCure.
Although it advanced the state-of-the-art in the area of flow-
based brute-force attack detection at the time it was proposed,
it soon became clear that it yielded too many false detections
in production environments. The root cause of these false
detections was the assumption that traffic in the brute-force
phase is observed flat; extensive analysis has shown that
especially attacks from far-away countries can feature quite
some retransmissions, for example, causing the network traffic
not to be completely flat anymore [6]. Our solution to this
problem was a new compromise detection algorithm that is
resilient against such variability at the network-layer, based on
analysing the behavior of attack tools upon a compromise [4].
The fact that the latest version of SSHCure features an accu-
racy close to 100% shows that this advancement of the state-
of-the-art is reliable enough for usage in production networks.
SSHCure has been open-source and available for free since
May 2012, and has seen a rapid adoption by both academia
and industry since then. We are aware of various deployments
in a plethora of environments, ranging from small Web-hosting
companies to backbone networks and government CSIRTs. A
wide audience was targeted right from the start of SSHCure’s
development efforts by providing installation scripts for many
Linux and BSD distributions, allowing even those users who
are less technical to use SSHCure. Selecting the popular open-
source flow collector NfSen2 as the underlying platform for
SSHCure has driven SSHCure’s wide deployment. Recently,
we have moved our development efforts from SourceForge3
to GitHub,4 in order to foster community interaction using
GitHub’s networking features. SSHCure is being actively
developed, maintained and supported, and is licensed under
the three-clause BSD license.
We will showcase the upcoming release of SSHCure 3.0
during the NetSys 2015 Demonstration Session. This release
features both new features and improvements:
• New user interface design, adapted to better suit the needs
of SSHCure users.
• Integration with security incident reporting tools, such
as Qmanage and AIRT, using XML-RPC, X-ARF and
IODEF interfaces. This allows SSHCure to be integrated
into existing security incident handling workflows, e.g.,
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM).
• Integration with the OpenBL SSH blacklist, providing
additional insights when analysing detection results.
• Full IPv6 support.
NetSys 2015 attendees will be able to explore SSHCure’s
new features and analyze attacks that target or originate from
the observed networks in a semi-live fashion. In particular,
we will demonstrate various situations that CSIRT members
encounter in their daily activities and how SSHCure supports
them in that. In chronological order, we will guide the audience
from the initial phases of attacks until the actual detection and
reporting of a compromise. While attacks are started in the
background, SSHCure will visualize the various attack phases
and provide technical details.
Those attendees wishing to explore SSHCure within their
own environment can install SSHCure themselves; the only
requirement is a Linux or BSD system that has NfSen installed,
together with several dependencies that are typically provided
2http://nfsen.sf.net
3http://sshcure.sf.net
4https://github.com/sshcure/sshcure
by any packet manager. The system should receive flow data
exported using NetFlow or IPFIX.
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